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Political Advantage, Disadvantage, and the Demand
for Partisan News
Allison M. N. Archer, University of Richmond

In this article, I argue that the national political environment can meaningfully affect variation in aggregate demand for
partisan media. I focus on the relationship between the political context—namely, political advantage and disadvantage
derived from elections—and media demand in the form of partisan newspaper circulations. Using a data set that characterizes the partisan slant of local newspapers and their circulation levels between 1932 and 2004, I ﬁnd that when parties
are electorally advantaged in presidential contests, demand for their afﬁliated newspapers decreases relative to demand
for papers afﬁliated with disadvantaged parties. I uncover evidence of similar patterns in a case study of Florida newspapers, and I also compare the power of presidential versus congressional outcomes in shaping feelings of advantage and
disadvantage. Taken together, these results provide evidence of a negative link between political advantage derived from
presidential elections and the relative demand for partisan news.

W

hy do citizens consume political news? This article examines the determinants of such news
consumption by focusing on the relationship between the national political context and partisan news demand. Studying the conditions under which individuals choose
to learn about politics is important because the press conveys
key information to the public ranging from parties’ platforms
to elected ofﬁcials’ behavior in ofﬁce. Citizens, in turn, are
thought to form political opinions and make political decisions on the basis of such information (e.g., Dahl 1998).
Of course, many of the political news sources that individuals rely on today are tinged with partisan bias (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Ho and
Quinn 2008), an attribute that also characterizes media offerings of the past. Given the presence of partisan media
throughout US history (e.g., Groeling and Baum [2013], but
see Schudson [1978]) and today, this article examines the
conditions under which aggregate demand for news afﬁliated with the Republican and Democratic parties surges or
declines. In doing so, I offer a new perspective on our understanding of partisan media that goes beyond their effects
on viewers (e.g., Levendusky 2013) or the implications of

changes in their supply (e.g., Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011). Instead, my primary research question asks:
how does the political environment affect demand for partisan news? I argue that a sense of advantage and disadvantage in the national electoral context can meaningfully inﬂuence relative partisan media consumption.
To understand how the political environment affects partisan media demand, my research (like Gerber and Huber
2009) incorporates data rich in ecological validity that look
beyond survey responses to study politically motivated behavior. Speciﬁcally, I examine two local Floridian papers’ circulations between 1932 and 2014 and the aggregate circulations of local, daily partisan papers in the United States from
1932 to 2004. In doing so, my results speak to the effects of
political advantage and disadvantage across different time periods and geographic contexts.
Such analyses also represent a new approach to the way
that we typically conceptualize the relationship between the
media and political outcomes. Existing literature often focuses on how nonpartisan and partisan media affect the political attitudes and behaviors of both citizens and elites (e.g.,
Clinton and Enamorado 2014; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007;
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Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Yet I take a different approach by
characterizing how factors in the political context inﬂuence
the relative demand for partisan media.
This article also helps adjudicate between competing hypotheses in the literature that suggest both advantage and
disadvantage could boost or depress partisan news demand.
While advantage could increase morale (see, e.g., Healy,
Malhotra, and Mo 2010) and partisan news consumption, it
may promote a sense of complacency that decreases incentives to monitor politics. Conversely, the threat related to
disadvantage may boost news demand (Marcus, Neuman,
and MacKuen 2000) but may also decrease efﬁcacy and lead
to political withdrawal (Hirschman 1970, as cited in Anderson et al. 2005).
Finally, examining the effects of advantage and disadvantage on partisan news demand has implications for the
relationships between citizens and elites. Knowing whether
the political context motivates some voters to consume more
partisan news than others is critical, as this could lead to
different responses to and interpretations of political outcomes on the basis of the content of such news. Asymmetries
in the monitoring of elites could also emerge, creating parallel asymmetries in accountability and representation. Thus,
understanding who pays attention most and when can provide
insight into the constraints elected ofﬁcials perceive among
their constituents.

CONNECTING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
TO PARTISAN MEDIA DEMAND
The goal of this article is to understand the relationship
between the national political context and demand for partisan media. I argue that beyond more stable, individual-level
traits like education, political advantage and disadvantage
derived from parties’ standings in national elections can meaningfully affect partisan news consumption. And because the
relative status of political parties ﬂuctuates over time (Anderson et al. 2005)—no one party has dominated the zero-sum
game of politics throughout US history—the advantage and
disadvantage felt by electoral winners and losers, respectively,
should similarly ﬂuctuate with the political context.
I focus on partisan news consumption because previous
work in political communication (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2008;
Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Severin and Tankard [1992], as cited
in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Stroud 2008, [2010], as
cited in Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar 2017), political psychology
(e.g., Lodge and Taber 2013), and economics (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) suggests that individuals prefer news
that aligns with their preexisting beliefs, including those that are
political. That is, individuals have a preference for partisanfriendly media. Even more, the presence of biased news,

which the literature attributes to supply- (Baron 2006) and
demand-side forces ([Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005], as cited in Galvis, Snyder, and
Song 2016), has long been a feature of the American media landscape, which allows me to trace the relationship of
interest across nearly a century. While Independent papers
emerged around the turn of the twentieth century (Schudson
1978), Gentzkow et al. (2011) ﬁnd evidence that partisan afﬁliations are rather enduring and can affect candidate endorsements into the twenty-ﬁrst century. Patterson and Donsbach
(1996, as cited in Baron 2006) also ﬁnd evidence that political
bias still affects decisions about story content and headlines
among journalists in Western democracies.1
Various strands of literature support two competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between the national political context and demand for partisan news, as well as the null
hypothesis that electoral conditions are unrelated to partisan
news consumption. Previous work ﬁnds that political interest
is rather stable over individuals’ lifetimes, as even short-term
disruptions often return to their long-term equilibrium within
a year (Prior 2010). Perhaps the decision to purchase a politically friendly paper (by subscribing or buying one copy of the
paper) is similarly stable in both the long and short term.
Should this be the case, the null hypothesis that the demand
for partisan media is orthogonal to political outcomes is a convincing possibility.2
However, caveats to Prior’s (2010) results suggest the political environment can affect interest, as he notes that Eastern
and Western Germans experienced spikes in political interest
surrounding the reuniﬁcation of Germany. Thus, it is plausible that electoral outcomes could also inﬂuence partisan
media demand in the short term, and the literature supports
1. Independent papers did emerge in the United States with the rise of
the high-speed printing press and penny press in the 1800s (Hamilton 2004;
Schudson 1978), but these papers still exhibited some partisan biases—they
were just less explicit about their afﬁliations (see also Gentzkow, Shapiro,
and Sinkinson 2014). Smaller, local papers that relied ﬁnancially on parties
and could not be sustained by advertising revenue alone like Independent
media (Petrova 2011, as cited in Galvis et al. 2016) operated with partisan
leanings into the 1900s (McGerr 1986). Even in the twentieth century when
objectivity was the goal of professional reporters, Schudson (1978) observes
there was skepticism that pure objectivity was or could ever be attained.
Finally, partisan editorials have long been featured in American papers
(Schudson 1978). In national data used in my main analyses, the mean
percentage of Independent papers (1932–2004) is 22.39% and remains
below 25% until 1984 (its maximum is 31.73% in 2000). The mean percentage of unafﬁliated papers is 0.96%.
2. If people are driven to seek more information evenhandedly, the
results would also support the null hypothesis. Those compelled by the
context to consume more news could subscribe to both Democratic and
Republican papers or do so in a random fashion that cancels out in the
aggregate. This would suggest no net change across local partisan newspaper demand.
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competing hypotheses regarding this relationship. First, demand for media afﬁliated with a party advantaged by favorable electoral conditions could increase, while demand for the
disadvantaged party’s media could decrease. The zero-sum
nature of electoral competition in particular facilitates this
effect because elections produce a clear winner and loser.
Electoral winners are often more supportive of their political
system than losers (Anderson et al. 2005); perhaps that sentiment also compels winners to consume more partisanfriendly news as a means of expressing support for and following their party. Political advantage could also engender
enthusiasm, an emotion that increases interest in campaigns
(Brader 2006), and may increase willingness to read partisan
news. Similarly, the euphoria that accompanies electoral triumphs (akin to the euphoria of a sports team’s victory; Healy
et al. 2010) might boost morale among advantaged partisans
and heighten their demand for partisan news. That is, an
electoral win could elicit reactions similar to those of sports
fans “basking” in the glow of their team’s win (Cialdini et al.
1976, as cited in Hirt et al. 1992), with partisans basking in
their party’s glory by reading more about their victory or the
opposition’s loss.
Conversely, supporters of a disadvantaged party may choose
to disengage from and exit politics (Hirschman 1970, as cited
in Anderson et al. 2005). Individuals are less likely to vote
when they expect to lose, particularly when they have repeatedly lost electoral contests (Anderson et al. 2005). Similar
patterns may hold for partisan news demand; political losers
may feel disconnected from politics and discouraged from
consuming such news because it reminds them of their disadvantage. Alternatively, political losers may feel angry or
aversive, emotions that lead to less systematic thought and an
increased proclivity for action (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese
2007; MacKuen et al. 2010). Those facing an unfavorable
climate may focus on political action (Huddy, Mason, and
Aaroe 2015; Valentino et al. 2011) instead of passively
reading news—particularly those who are internally efﬁcacious (Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009)—as a
means of reversing their disadvantaged status.
With these forces at work among advantaged and disadvantaged partisans, one outcome that these theories support is that
H1. Demand for media afﬁliated with electorally advantaged parties should increase relative to demand for
media afﬁliated with electorally disadvantaged parties.
Directly comparing demand for the two types of media sheds
light on which are being consumed more or less—and potentially, which party is being monitored more or less.
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Alternatively, the literature supports a competing hypothesis: demand for media afﬁliated with disadvantaged parties
could increase, while favorable conditions may inhibit demand for advantaged parties’ media. The electorally advantaged may feel more complacent than enthusiastic, leading
them to engage in politics without much critical thought
(Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). Such contentment could lead advantaged partisans to let their guards
down and rely on political habits instead of seeking out more
partisan news. They may also defer to the ofﬁcials they voted
for, as winners generally have more trust in government than
losers (Anderson et al. 2005). With this mind-set, increased
partisan news consumption is unnecessary.
In contrast, electoral disadvantage could signal a threatening event that induces anxiety and promotes partisan news
consumption. Anxiety signals failure and uncertainty (Steenbergen and Ellis 2006, as cited in Albertson and Gadarian
2015), which motivates individuals to seek out new information to resolve those negative feelings (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000;
Valentino et al. 2008). For instance, anxiety over immigration
boosts information seeking about that topic (Albertson and
Gadarian 2015), and fear cues—not enthusiasm cues—stimulate TV news consumption (Brader 2006). Importantly, individuals tend to seek out unbalanced, partisan friendly information in the face of anxiety (Valentino, Banks, et al. 2009).3
Electoral losers are persistently less satisﬁed with the political system than winners, have less trust in government,
and are more likely to protest. Additionally, electoral loss often increases support for changes to the electoral system (Anderson et al. 2005). Such political discontent coupled with a
desire for change could motivate losers to consume more
partisan news as a means of monitoring the opposition. Consuming partisan news can also help disadvantaged partisans
cope with their loss by spinning their circumstances into something positive for their party. For example, Bill O’Reilly told
Republicans there was a silver lining to their loss in the 2012
presidential election: the pressure on Democrats was now
such that “if the economy doesn’t improve dramatically over
the next four years, the Democratic Party will evaporate”
(2012).
Taken together, this second set of theories suggests the
opposite of hypothesis 1:
H2. Demand for media afﬁliated with electorally disadvantaged parties should increase relative to demand
for media afﬁliated with electorally advantaged parties.
3. This is true unless one has to defend one’s beliefs later, making a
balanced search beneﬁcial (Valentino, Banks, et al. 2009).
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In the following sections, I examine variation in aggregatelevel demand for partisan news to determine whether evidence consistent with these expectations exists. In doing so,
my results speak to the ﬁrst-order conditions of the relationship of interest; that is, the ﬁndings will shed light on
which of the predicted patterns occur in the aggregate—if at
all. These data will not be able to discern which of the mechanisms predicted by the individual-level studies are at play
(see, e.g., Kramer 1983), as the literature in support of each
hypothesis point to observationally equivalent outcomes. However, uncovering evidence rich in ecological realism at the
aggregate level that is consistent with individual-level studies
equally rich in internal validity allows us to be more conﬁdent
in our understanding of how the political context relates to
partisan media demand.

per fell from 69% in 1869 to 3% in 2004. (See the appendix,
available online for more details.)
However, if citizens have only one newspaper in their city,
the ﬁnancial decision to purchase or not purchase a local
paper could still be affected by national politics. My results
are likely conservative because those with only one local
partisan paper may continue to subscribe to it so they can
access news even when national political forces motivate
them to do otherwise. In sum, studying local newspapers is
critical because they expose readers to important information ranging from ideology to elected ofﬁcials’ behavior. And
though papers have faced economic distress and new media
have emerged over time, focusing on newspapers allows me
to trace the relationship between advantage, disadvantage,
and demand across nearly one century.4

A case study of Florida papers
ADVANTAGE, DISADVANTAGE, AND LOCAL
PARTISAN PAPERS’ CIRCULATIONS
In studying the relationship between the national political
context and partisan media demand, I focus primarily on the
demand for local, daily partisan newspapers. I view such
papers as just one form of partisan media that the political
context can inﬂuence. Other forms could certainly be analyzed, but this medium’s long-standing presence and prevalence throughout US history makes it a compelling case.
And while the media environments in which local partisan
papers exist have changed over time, I attempt to control for
such changes in the analyses below.
Newspapers are an appropriate medium to study for several additional reasons. Throughout much of US history, papers were used as a platform for coalition merchants to advocate their stances on issues such as race. In doing so, these
individuals used newspapers to guide the evolution of the
parties’ ideologies over time (Noel 2012). Papers also enjoy
greater space to cover the news than TV broadcasts, which are
constrained to sound bites and stories that last only minutes.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, local papers tend to set the news
agendas that their broadcast counterparts follow. Local papers also help hold elected ofﬁcials accountable given their
reporters’ knowledge of and easy access to lower-level bureaucratic processes (Arnold 2006).
In recent years, economic distress has certainly plagued
the newspaper industry. Notable local papers like the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer shifted to online coverage only (Yardley
and Pérez-Peña 2009), while others have shut down entirely
(see Dumpala 2009), giving citizens fewer choices in local
papers that they can purchase. Aggregate circulations of local
partisan papers suggest that among US cities with at least one
paper, the mean percentage of cities with more than one pa-

To gain insight into the relationship between the political
environment and demand for like-minded news, I ﬁrst focus
on the weekday circulations of two prominent papers in the
Tampa Bay area of Florida: The Tampa Bay Times (formerly
known as the St. Petersburg Times) and The Tampa Tribune.
This case study serves as an ideal starting point for my analyses for several reasons. First, scholarly work has demonstrated
that there are ideological differences in the papers’ content:
Prior to the Tampa Bay Times’ purchase of The Tampa Tribune in 2016, analyses found the former leaned Democratic
with more liberal content, while the latter leaned Republican with more conservative content (Gentzkow and Shapiro
2010).5 Therefore, this region had the option to consume two
local papers with different political leanings. Tampa Bay is
also neither staunchly Republican nor staunchly Democratic;
in fact, it has been considered a swing region in the swing
state of Florida (Cohen 2012). Such heterogeneity in partisanship suggests that there will likely be variation (i.e., a mix
of “winners” and “losers”) in response to changes in the political context.
Papers in the Tampa Bay region also do not serve parts of
the country like Washington, DC, in which citizens are more
likely to be political junkies who perennially subscribe to
newspapers regardless of the context. Even more, papers in
Tampa Bay differ from those in cities like New York, which
4. Depending on the research question, future work should consider
the effects of local papers’ dwindling budgets on reporting and these
papers’ demise over time. I make efforts to account for trends across time
and outline those below.
5. The media directory Mondo Times corroborates these ideological
slants (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010); however, Budak, Goel, and Rao
(2016) suggest that Gentzkow and Shapiro’s (2010) ﬁndings may overstate
news outlets’ bias.
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serve not only locals but also people throughout the country
who are consistently more attentive to politics. Finally, while
the politics of Tampa Bay have been characterized at times
by patronage, corruption, and machines (Kerstein 1991), its
political history still has not been dominated by party bosses
and formal party organizations like that of Northern cities
(e.g., Chicago). Thus, the relatively weaker presence of political machines in Tampa Bay is helpful because a more
dominant political class composed of party machines may
have systematically deterred residents from following and
engaging with politics.
To understand how the national political context affects
newspaper circulations, I regress the relative changes in the
demand for both Tampa Bay papers on presidential election
outcomes. My primary independent variable is the difference
in the two-party national vote share as a percentage of all
votes cast. Formally, I subtract the Democratic Party’s national votes from those of the Republican Party in presidential election year t and divide that value by the total votes
cast:
(Republican Votest ) 2 (Democratic Votest )
# 100:
Total Votest
Positive values of this variable, GOP Vote Margin, generally
indicate a Republican victory and an electorate that is presumably more disposed toward Republican ideas, while negative values indicate a Democratic victory.6 I use presidential
elections to operationalize the political context because I am
interested in how advantage and disadvantage permeating
the nation affect demand for local partisan news. Additionally, presidential elections rose in prominence throughout the
twentieth century as the relative importance of the ofﬁce
increased (Moe and Howell 1999), and the president’s relative ability to achieve policy goals was enhanced. Thus, presidential contests are likely to serve as powerful political stimuli that inﬂuence demand for partisan news.7
Additionally, I focus on 1932 to 2014 for several reasons.
First, illiteracy rates fell below 5% in the 1930s (National
Center for Education Statistics 1993), which decreases the
proportion of individuals who did not purchase newspapers
simply because they could not read. This time period also
contains the eras in which radio (1932–52) and television
(1956–2004) enjoyed a national penetration rate of at least
50% (Sterling 1984, as cited in Gentzkow et al. 2011). Thus, it
6. Election data were collected in 2014 from http://www.uselectionatlas
.org. See the appendix for a plot of GOP Vote Margin.
7. Local political forces (e.g., how one’s district or state votes) could
certainly motivate partisan news consumption. Studying their effects is
beyond the scope of this article but represents an interesting avenue for
future work.
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could be that individuals still purchasing newspapers represent a more politically fervent segment of the population
that is strongly affected by the changing political environment. Such factors combined could heighten the ability of
presidential elections to affect demand for local partisan papers.
To construct the dependent variable of relative partisan
media demand, I rely on original newspaper circulation data
collected by the author from the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook (1932–2010) and the Editor & Publisher
International Databook (2012–14). This outcome variable is
calculated as a measure of the relative changes in weekday
circulations for each paper, and I focus on the change in
circulations every four years in response to presidential election outcomes. I ﬁrst calculate the change in circulations from
the year after one presidential election to the year after the
next presidential election for each paper. These values illustrate how demand for the Democratic paper changed over
time and how demand for the Republican paper changed over
time. Then, I subtract the change in the Democratic-leaning
paper (i.e., the Tampa Bay Times) from that of the Republicanleaning paper (i.e., The Tampa Tribune) and convert that value
to a percentage of total circulations. Formally, for each presidential election year I calculate:
(Rt11 2 Rt23 ) 2 (Dt11 2 Dt23 )
# 100;
Rt11 1 Dt11
where Rt11 is the circulation level of the Republican-leaning
paper in the year after presidential election year t, Rt23 is the
circulation level of the Republican-leaning paper in the year
after the previous election year t 2 4, Dt11 is the circulation
level of the Democratic-leaning paper in the year after election year t, and Dt23 is the circulation level of the Democratic
paper in the year after the previous election year t 2 4.
By subtracting the change in the Democratic paper’s
circulations from that of the Republican paper’s circulations,
I am essentially comparing the papers’ circulations while
controlling for their raw differences and subtracting out confounding factors that equally affected both, such as wars or
natural disasters (e.g., Card and Krueger 1994; Clinton and
Enamorado 2014). This measure effectively controls for systematic factors by differencing out their common effects for
each paper.8 Importantly, these aggregate-level data speak to
aggregate-level patterns, so not all individuals in all years will

8. See the appendix for a plot of this measure. This is not a traditional
difference-in-differences (DiD) setup, but it has similarities. I assume that
in the absence of an election, circulations from the last election would
follow parallel trajectories over time (e.g., Abadie 2005). They are, in effect, a baseline against which changes are compared.
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Figure 1. Relationship between GOP vote margin and relative changes in circulations for Tampa Bay partisan papers

behave the same way.9 And while the timing of this analysis
points to a causal relationship between presidential elections
and the relative demand for the two papers, these data are still
observational and the analysis is ultimately correlational.
To understand how the political context affects news demand, ﬁgure 1 depicts the bivariate relationship between
the electoral context and relative changes in the papers’ circulations. The plotted values suggest a negative correlation,
which column 1 of table 1 conﬁrms is statistically signiﬁcant
(b p 20:24; p p :03).10 Substantively, an increase of one
standard deviation (12.48 percentage points) in the percentage of votes received by the Republican Party over the
Democratic Party corresponds with the Democratic-leaning
Tampa Bay Times gaining roughly 10,110.03 circulations
more than the Republican-leaning Tampa Tribune.11 Including control variables for the change in gross domestic product
(GDP) taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the
lagged Republican vote margin, and the radio era of 1932 to
1952 (Sterling 1984, as cited in Gentzkow et al. 2011) in columns 2–4, respectively, suggests the negative relationship
between GOP Vote Margin and relative circulation changes is
quite robust.
9. Future work could examine this relationship among individuals to
uncover the mechanisms driving overall patterns.
10. All analyses in this article use robust standard errors to account
for any issues with collinearity or heteroskedasticity.
11. To calculate this value, I multiplied the standard deviation of GOP
Vote Margin by 20.24. I then divided that by 100 and multiplied by the
mean total circulations in the year after an election (337,540.90).

In column 5, I control for time and time2, which detrend
the data and decrease the signiﬁcance of GOP Vote Margin.
Though it is still negatively signed (b p 20:08), this coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant (p p :37). Finally, column 6 uses an alternative speciﬁcation that also controls for
time trends but in a different manner. Here the data set is
reorganized so that the unit of analysis is year-party of paper;
that is, each row contains the circulations of party j’s paper, so
there are two rows per election year—one for each party’s
paper. The dependent variable in this model is the change in
the circulations of party j’s paper from the year after the previous election (t 2 3) to the year after the current election
(t 1 1), and the key independent variable is Winner, which
represents whether or not the party afﬁliated with a given
paper won year t’s presidential election. Controls for time
using decade ﬁxed effects are also included.12 The coefﬁcient for Winner describes the average difference between the
change in circulations for the winning party’s paper and the
change in circulations for the losing party’s paper. The results
again point to a negative, albeit insigniﬁcant, relationship: the
disadvantaged party’s paper gains an average of 3,596 more
circulations than the advantaged party’s paper from the year
after the last election to the year after the current election
(p p :42, two-tailed). (Note that p-values are lower in mod12. I use time and time2 in model 5 and decade ﬁxed effects here instead of year ﬁxed effects because of the low N in this data set and concerns
of overﬁtting the model. In table 1, col. 6, robust standard errors clustered
by year are used.
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Table 1. Political Environment and Demand for Partisan Newspapers in Tampa Bay, 1932–2014

GOP vote margin (%)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2.24**
(.10)

2.24**
(.11)
2.0008
(.002)

2.20*
(.10)

2.14*
(.07)

2.08
(.09)

Change in GDP

2.10
(.10)

GOP vote margin lagged (%)
Radio period

8.37*
(4.16)
22.64**
(1.17)
.10*
(.05)

Time
Time2
Winner
Decade ﬁxed effects
Intercept
N
R2

(6)

2.94
(1.38)
20
.19

.02
(2.43)
18
.22

21.04
(1.34)
20
.22

22.99***
(.98)
20
.45

13.58*
(6.68)
20
.43

23,595.95
(4,310.70)
Yes
9,041.48***
(2,155.35)
40
.80

Note. Ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variables in cols. 1–5 are a relative measure of the changes in the two papers’ circulations over time as a percentage of
circulations in the year after a presidential election. Column 6 uses the alternative speciﬁcation with the change in
circulations for party j’s paper as the dependent variable, with standard errors clustered by year. GDP p gross domestic product.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01, two-tailed.

els with other controls or operationalizations of the independent variable. See the appendix for full results.)
Taken together, the ﬁndings in this case study are consistent with hypothesis 2’s expectation of a negative relationship between political advantage and the relative demand for
partisan-afﬁliated media. However, these results are not robust to all speciﬁcations in table 1, and the analysis is limited
to one speciﬁc part of the country. The next section draws on
a more geographically expansive data set with which I examine circulations for all local partisan papers across states.
Doing so helps us understand if and how the national political
context affects relative, aggregate demand for partisan media
both across time and throughout the United States.

tionalized as the difference in the two parties’ votes received
in presidential elections divided by all votes cast.13 To measure
demand for local partisan papers, I rely on a data set collected
by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2012). These data detail the circulations for local daily papers in presidential election years from 1869 to 2004 and classify every newspaper
as Republican, Democratic, Independent, or unafﬁliated. Like
before, I begin my analysis in 1932 but end it in 2004, as this
is the last year of this data set.14
While recent scholarship attempts to quantify and rank
the ideology of media outlets, this work characterizes a narrow sliver of the contemporary media environment (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Ho and

An analysis of all local, daily partisan
newspaper circulations

13. Analyses with a denominator summing the two parties’ votes only
produce similar results (see the appendix).
14. Data for these years are from the Editor & Publisher Yearbook and
include only general-circulation English-language daily US papers (distributed on at least four weekdays). National papers are excluded. Data are
missing for !1% of partisan papers and were downloaded from ICPSR in
February 2014; they since have been revised online.

To understand the effects of national political conditions on
partisan news consumption across time and the entire United
States, I focus on the demand for all local, daily partisan newspapers from 1932 to 2004. The political context is again opera-
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Quinn 2008) or an even narrower sample of historical papers
(e.g., Groeling and Baum 2013) and is unhelpful for this
analysis. Therefore, I rely on the coding scheme of Gentzkow
et al. (2011) to determine the political associations of local
newspapers. Speciﬁcally, the authors use whether or not the
paper had ever formally declared a Republican, Democratic,
or Independent afﬁliation to assign political associations.
The assumption of time-invariant partisan reputations is
strong, but Gentzkow et al. (2011) conduct content analyses
to show that between 1872 and 1928—the years in which papers were the preeminent source of news—Republican papers
devoted 48% of their candidate mentions to Republicans while
Democratic papers mentioned Republican candidates only
29% of the time, a difference that is highly signiﬁcant. In more
recent years (1932–2004), historically Republican papers endorsed Republican candidates 90% of the time, while historically Democratic papers endorsed Republican candidates
only 45% of the time (Gentzkow et al. 2011).15
To understand the relative demand for partisan papers, I
focus again on the changes in circulation trends. Here I use a
measure of Republican and Democratic papers that calculates the change in circulations from the previous election
year to the current one for both types of papers and then subtracts the change in Democratic papers from that of Republican papers. This measure again allows me to identify relative
changes in demand for the two types of papers while also
subtracting out the common effects of confounding factors
and controlling for disparities in the papers’ raw circulation
levels. Formally, for each presidential election year t I calculate
(Rt 2 Rt24 ) 2 (Dt 2 Dt24 )
# 100;
Total Circulationst
where Rt is the circulation level of Republican papers in presidential election year t, Rt24 is the circulation level of Republican papers in the previous election year t 2 4, Dt is the
circulation level of Democratic papers in election year t, and
Dt24 is the circulation level of Democratic papers in the last
election year t 2 4. Like before, I divide this measure by total
circulations in election year t.16

15. In the few cases in which a paper switched partisanship, the majority afﬁliation is used. The endorsement rate of out-party candidates is a
bit high for Democratic papers. Ideally, I would use more ﬁne-grained
data with the strength of papers’ bias assessed at each election; the political
context could have a stronger effect on demand for more partisan papers.
Unfortunately, such data are not readily available, so I follow Gentzkow
et al. (2011) and use the afﬁliation provided. See the appendix for more
analyses in support of this choice and a plot of circulations.
16. See the appendix for plot of DV and results with only partisan
papers in the denominator (which are similar).

Ideally, I would focus on circulations in the year following
presidential elections, as I did in the Florida case study. However, aggregate circulation data in the year after presidential
elections are not readily available for all local partisan papers
in the country from 1932 to 2004. Therefore, I make a key
assumption in support of my model choice that is based on
analyses of newly collected data consisting of a sample of
papers’ yearly circulations: I assume that newspapers’ circulations in year t versus year t 1 1 are linearly related to one
another.17 (This does not preclude the possibility of circulations changing meaningfully every four years, as incremental changes each year could result in larger differences in
circulations between every fourth year.)
It is also reassuring that analyses of the Tampa Bay papers
produce substantively similar—and if anything, more conservative—results using this version of my outcome measure. GOP Vote Margin’s coefﬁcient using circulation changes
from year t 2 3 to year t 1 1 as the dependent variable is
20.24 (p p :03) in a bivariate regression compared to b p
20:19 (p p :12) using circulation changes from year t 2 4
to year t. (See the appendix for full results.)
I also assume that the sense that the advantaged party will
win can be palpable to voters prior to Election Day. For instance, the 1984 election was a landslide victory for Republican President Ronald Reagan, who won 58.8% of the popular vote. Even more, Reagan’s approval ratings exceeded
his disapproval ratings throughout 1984 (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives 2015), so it is possible that the surge in
Democratic papers’ circulations in 1984 was due to Democrats sensing their impending loss prior to November and
adjusting their media demand in real time.18
Figure 2 plots the relationship between the vote margin of
the Republican Party in a given presidential election year and
the relative changes in the papers’ circulations. The bivariate
regression line also pictured summarizes the negative relationship between the two: as the percentage of votes received
by Republicans over Democrats increases, Republican papers’
circulations actually decrease compared to those of Democratic papers (b p 20:10; p p :01).
Statistical analyses in column 1 of table 2 conﬁrm the signiﬁcance and robustness of this negative correlation. Substantively, the results suggest a 1 standard deviation increase
(13.06 percentage points) in the percentage of votes received

17. To validate this assumption, I collected 13 notable papers’ annual
circulations (1930–2013), and I ﬁnd year-to-year circulations are closely
related (average b p 0:92 regressing t on t 2 1). Analyses are in the appendix.
18. The effects I uncover in these analyses are, of course, average effects, so this will not always be true in each year.
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Figure 2. Relationship between GOP vote margin and relative changes in circulations for all local partisan papers

by the Republican Party over the Democratic Party corresponds with Democratic newspapers gaining roughly 693,486
more circulations than Republican papers.19 This ﬁnding
provides evidence consistent with hypothesis 2’s expectation
of a negative relationship between relative advantage and relative demand.
To ensure the robustness of this ﬁnding and to reduce the
possibility that it is due to omitted variables, table 2 also reports several other speciﬁcations similar to those used in the
Florida case study. I again control for changes in GDP from
the previous election year to the current one. Column 2 suggests change in GDP does marginally affect the relative changes
in circulations between the two papers, but the effect of GOP
Vote Margin remains negative and signiﬁcant.20 Column 3
includes the lagged GOP Vote Margin, and the results not
only suggest the lagged vote margin is insigniﬁcant, but the
independent variable of interest is again negative and significant.
I also examine whether the changing nature of the media
environment across the radio and TV eras (see Gentzkow
et al. 2011) may be driving the results. Column 4 suggests
this is not the case, as the size and signiﬁcance of GOP Vote
Margin remain largely intact. Analyses in the appendix dividing 1932–2004 into thirds also alleviate concerns that

19. I calculated this number by multiplying the standard deviation of
GOP Vote Margin by the key coefﬁcient: 20.10. I divide that by 100 and
multiply it by the mean of all circulations (53,100,000).
20. Results are the same using raw GDP; see the appendix.

results are conﬁned to one era, as the coefﬁcient of interest is consistently negative and does not differ signiﬁcantly
over time. Further, column 5 detrends the data by including
measures for time and time2. Neither reaches signiﬁcance,
while GOP Vote Margin is negative, albeit smaller in magnitude (b p 20:06) and signiﬁcance (p p :19) than before.
It is reassuring, though, that placebo tests using election
results from t 2 8, t 2 4, t 1 4, and t 1 8 while controlling
for time and time2 produce effects that are smaller in absolute
magnitude and much less signiﬁcant.21
The model in the last column of table 2 accounts for time
trends in a different manner while employing an alternative
speciﬁcation similar to what was used in the last column of
table 1. Here the data are reorganized so that the unit of
analysis is year-state-party of paper. Each row contains the
circulations of party j’s papers in each election year-state
combination (i.e., two rows per year-state combination—
one for each party’s papers). Similar to before, the dependent
variable is the change in the circulations of party j’s papers
within a state from the previous election year (t 2 4) to the
current election year (t). The key independent variable is
again Winner, a dummy for whether the papers’ party won
21. Clinton and Enamorado (2014) use similar placebo analyses. See
the appendix for these results and more related ﬁgures and robustness
checks, including analyses using bootstrapping and analyses focusing on
cities with one partisan paper for each party, as well as years with more
competitive elections vs. noncompetitive ones. I also demonstrate that
changes in GOP Vote Margin across elections do not seem to drive paper
consumption.
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Table 2. Political Environment and Demand for All Local Partisan Newspapers, 1932–2004

GOP vote margin (%)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2.10**
(.04)

2.07**
(.03)
2.0009*
(.0005)

2.10**
(.04)

2.08*
(.04)

2.06
(.04)

Change in GDP

2.02
(.04)

GOP vote margin lagged (%)
Radio period

1.39
(.91)
2.45
(.41)
.01
(.02)

Time
Time2
Winner
State-year ﬁxed effects
Intercept
N
R2

(6)

.28
(.41)
19
.36

.74
(.56)
18
.40

.29
(.41)
19
.37

2.14
(.45)
19
.43

3.02
(1.89)
19
.52

29,292.30**
(4,520.64)
Yes
77,831.65
(77,904.64)
1,938
.50

Note. Ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–5 use a dependent variable that is a relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers’ circulations over time as a percentage of
all circulations in a given presidential election year. Column 6 uses the alternative speciﬁcation with the change in
circulations for party j’s paper as the dependent variable. GDP p gross domestic product.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01, two-tailed.

the presidential election. Controls for time and region using
state-year ﬁxed effects are also included.22 Therefore, the coefﬁcient for Winner again represents the average difference
between the change in circulations for the winning versus losing party’s papers in each state-year combination. Column 6
indicates the key coefﬁcient is both negative and signiﬁcant
(b p 29;292:30; p p :04). Aggregating the effect size to the
national level (i.e., multiplying the coefﬁcient by 51 to include
Washington, DC) suggests the disadvantaged party’s papers
gain roughly 473,907 more circulations throughout the nation than the advantaged party’s papers.23
Taken together, the results in table 2 provide repeated
evidence that the political context is meaningfully correlated

22. See the appendix for robustness checks with different ﬁxed effects
and an alternative version of the key IV.
23. To alleviate concerns that changes in Southern voters’ partisanship during this era (Stanley 1988) are driving results, I drop the 11 former
confederate states. Doing so has no effect on my ﬁndings; see the appendix
for results.

with aggregate partisan media demand. In particular, the
results are consistent with—though not dispositive of—hypothesis 2’s causal expectation that when parties are electorally advantaged, demand for their afﬁliated local papers
decreases relative to demand for the disadvantaged party’s
papers. This negative link helps alleviate concerns of endogeneity, as it is unlikely the same forces increasing one type of
paper’s circulations would also depress voter turnout for its
afﬁliated party. And while the ﬁndings do not allow us to discern whether the advantaged are reading less, the disadvantaged are reading more, or if it is a mixture of both, the results
do undermine hypothesis 1’s prediction of a positive link
between advantage and relative demand, as well as the null
hypothesis that the political context is unrelated to partisan
news consumption.

ALL EYES ON THE WHITE HOUSE
Thus far, my analyses have suggested a negative link between
partisan newspaper circulations and advantage in the national political context operationalized solely in terms of

Volume 80

the presidency. However, elected ofﬁcials besides the
commander-in-chief could set the tone of the political environment. In this section, I expand my analysis of local partisan paper circulations to consider how the partisan makeup
of the House of Representatives may inﬂuence feelings of
political advantage and disadvantage in comparison to presidential election outcomes.
Examining the House over the Senate in my analysis
makes sense because all 435 members of the House face reelection at the same time unlike the staggered terms of their
Senate counterparts. Thus, the attention given to all of the
House seats versus a subset of Senate seats is better positioned to inﬂuence the dynamics of political advantage and
disadvantage. Additionally, members of the lower chamber
still enjoy media attention given their lawmaking and over-
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sight roles on issues that affect citizens’ lives ranging from
national security to healthcare.
In these analyses, I use the partisan makeup of the House
elected in the same year as the president to operationalize
relative advantage or disadvantage in the lower chamber. I
subtract the number of Democratic seats elected from Republican seats and convert that value to a percentage of total
seats to form GOP House Seat Margin. Positive values reﬂect
instances in which there are more House Republicans than
Democrats. For my dependent variable, I again use the two
measures of circulation changes for all local partisan newspapers (1932–2004) from table 2.
I ﬁrst focus on the dependent variable used in the ﬁrst ﬁve
models of table 2. Model 1 of table 3 reports a negative and
marginally signiﬁcant bivariate correlation between GOP

Table 3. Differential Effects of the Political Environment on Demand for Partisan Newspapers,
1932–2004

GOP House seat margin (%)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2.05
(.03)

2.005
(.04)
2.10**
(.04)

.05
(.03)
2.10***
(.03)
2.001**
(.0005)

2.01
(.04)
2.08*
(.05)

.002
(.03)
2.08*
(.04)

.03
(.04)
2.081
(.05)

GOP vote margin (%)
Change in GDP

2.02
(.05)

GOP vote margin lagged (%)
Radio period

1.40
(.91)
2.42
(.43)
.01
(.02)

Time
Time2
House seats
Winner
State-year ﬁxed effects
Intercept
N
R2

(7)

2.51
(.50)
19
.15

.21
(.64)
19
.36

1.88*
(.89)
18
.49

.06
(.71)
19
.38

2.11
(.67)
19
.43

3.58*
(1.78)
19
.54

225.37
(52.27)
28,153.441
(5,120.93)
Yes
82,716.18
(80,490.82)
1,938
.50

Note. Ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1–6 use a dependent variable that is a relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers’ circulations over time as a percentage of
all circulations in a given presidential election year. Column 7 uses the alternative speciﬁcation with the change in
circulations for party j’s paper as the dependent variable. GDP p gross domestic product.
1
p ! .12.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01, two-tailed.
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In defense of their decision to publish a controversial article
about government surveillance of terrorists’ ﬁnancial transactions, the former top editors of The New York Times and
The Los Angeles Times wrote that “Our job . . . is to bring our
readers information that will enable them to judge how well
their elected leaders are ﬁghting on their behalf, and at what
price” (Baquet and Keller 2006). Normative theories of democracy also uphold the importance of free-ﬂowing informa-

tion as it enhances citizens’ abilities to hold elites accountable
(Dahl 1998).
Given the press’s import, it is crucial that scholars understand the determinants of media consumption, particularly its political determinants. My work represents one
approach to doing so by examining how advantage and disadvantage in the political environment affect relative partisan news demand. While many scholars have considered
the effects of media consumption on political outcomes like
voter turnout or candidate choice, I examine whether political outcomes affect the consumption of partisan news.
Taken together, these analyses provide compelling evidence
of a negative correlation between political advantage and
relative, aggregate partisan media consumption across nearly
a century. This article is the ﬁrst to my knowledge that establishes the ﬁrst-order conditions for such a relationship. The
ﬁndings also undermine the plausibility of both the null hypothesis and the expectation that political advantage could
boost partisan media demand relative to disadvantage in the
aggregate. Additionally, I ﬁnd that presidential election outcomes tend to overpower those related to the House in terms
of inﬂuence over partisan media demand.
Focusing on local partisan newspaper circulations has
provided a broad historical view of the relationship of interest, but cable news channels like Fox News and MSNBC
have emerged more recently as prominent sources of partisan news for Republicans and Democrats, respectively (Levendusky 2013). Research on partisan media has and should
continue to draw on this contemporary news medium, and
it can also shed light on the results in this article. Because
partisan cable news is rather new—Fox News was created in
1996, while MSNBC began to lean left in 2007 (Pew 2007)—I
am limited in the analyses I can perform. Therefore, I brieﬂy
examine ﬂuctuations in these channels’ median prime-time
audiences below. In doing so, I ﬁnd further evidence of a
negative link between advantage and relative partisan media
demand.25
For instance, after the 2008 election, Democrats were advantaged with control of the White House and majorities in
both houses of Congress, while Republicans were disadvantaged. That disadvantaged status seems to have propelled Republicans to watch friendly cable TV news at a greater rate
than Democrats: Fox News’s median prime-time viewership increased 19.02% from 2008 to 2009 compared to MSNBC’s
increase of 2.5%. Similarly, 2012 saw the reelection of President

24. Using the vote share won by party j produces similar results. See
the appendix for the full table.

25. See the appendix for a plot of changes in their prime-time audiences.

House Seat Margin and relative changes in demand for local
partisan papers (b p 20:05; p p :12). However, model 2 of
table 3 regresses the dependent variable on both the GOP
House Seat Margin and GOP [Presidential] Vote Margin, the
latter of which is identical to the measure used in the last two
sections. Including both the House and presidency allows for
a direct comparison between the inﬂuence of congressional
electoral outcomes and presidential ones. And though the
two are correlated at 0.60, it is plausible that they each still
have independent effects.
Though still negative, the coefﬁcient for House seats is
now insigniﬁcant (b p 20:005; p p :90), while that of presidential elections is negative and signiﬁcant (b p 20:10;
p p :03). This suggests the signiﬁcance of congressional outcomes in column 1 of table 3 was largely due to that measure
tapping into House and presidential outcomes simultaneously.
Columns 3–6 report robustness checks similar to those used
in previous analyses, and suggest that even when controlling
for a variety of other factors, the effect of presidential outcomes overpowers House outcomes. Finally, column 7 employs the alternative speciﬁcation used in the last column of
table 2. Once again, there is a negative and signiﬁcant effect
of winning the presidential election (b p 28;153:44; p p
:11), but the effect of House seats won is insigniﬁcant
(b p 225:37; p p :63).24
In sum, the results suggest that even though House races
have meaningful political consequences, their overall inﬂuence on the relative demand for partisan newspapers is outshadowed by presidential campaigns and elections. That is,
citizens seem to take cues of advantage and disadvantage
more from the party of the presidency than the partisan
makeup of the House. Such asymmetries in attention paid to
different political actors could have implications for asymmetries in citizens’ abilities to monitor and hold elected representatives accountable.

CONCLUSION
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Obama, plus Democrats gained back eights seats in the House
and one in the Senate. Thus, Republicans were relatively disadvantaged, while Democrats were advantaged. Changes in
viewership again suggest that advantage dampens demand
for partisan news relative to disadvantage: while MSNBC
saw a 24.21% decrease in audience share from 2012 to 2013,
Fox News experienced only a 5.67% decrease. Even in the
months right after the election of Republican Donald Trump,
prime-time viewership for MSNBC increased 55% from one
year prior—a growth rate that is larger than its rivals (Grynbaum and Koblin 2017). In sum, these patterns suggest the
results based on local partisan newspapers may generalize to
another, more contemporary form of partisan media.
Throughout this article, it has been reassuring that the
results based on aggregate-level data, which are rich in ecological realism and focus on actual behavior instead of potentially biased self-reports (Prior 2009), have been consistent
with individual-level studies of information demand (e.g.,
Marcus et al. 2000). However, using solely aggregate data can
lead to problems of ecological inference, as I cannot clearly
identify the mechanism(s) at play. For instance, I cannot discern whether in- or out-party affect is a stronger force, or
whether advantaged partisans are consuming less, disadvantaged partisans are consuming more, or a bit of both is at play.
Future work could further this research by pinpointing which
of the plausible individual-level mechanisms are driving these
overall patterns.
Finally, the results of this article can speak to critical issues of accountability and representation. If advantaged partisans sometimes check out of politics and blindly trust
elected ofﬁcials, then the monitoring of those who govern
may be uneven. Consequently, the feedback given to representatives may be in one party’s best interest, while those in
the other party may not voice their opinions as intensely.
Those whose party is out of power may also be more likely
to act on opinions formed after consuming partisan-tinged
news that misrepresent reality. Future work might examine
if the disadvantaged are generally more critical, outspoken,
and politically active with a focus on the next election or perhaps more likely to participate as a result of consuming biased
information. In the end, understanding how advantage and
disadvantage affect the relative demand for partisan news
sheds light on both the political determinants of partisan media
consumption and also the relationship between elites and
citizens in democratic societies.
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